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Should the WTO Expand GATT Article XX: An
Analysis of United States - Standards for
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline
Cynthia M. Maas
In 1963 the U.S. Congress passed the Clean Air Act (CAA)'
in an effort to halt increasing air pollution caused by industriali-
zation and automobiles. 2 The CAA focused initially on new ve-
hicle standards. Congress amended the CAA in 1990 to address
vehicle emissions due to fuel constituents. 3 The U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) created its gasoline regulation
to facilitate compliance with the Clean Air Act amendments. 4
The regulation, however, establishes different requirements for
domestic and foreign gasoline.5 As a result, Venezuela and Bra-
zil claimed that the regulation violates the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)6 and challenged the regulation
under the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement
procedures. 7 A WTO panel decided against the United States,
1. The CAA is the popular name for the Air Pollution Prevention and Con-
trol Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
2. Pamela Cohn, Automobile Pollution: Japan and the United States-Co-
operation or Competition?, 9 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 179, 193 (1995).
3. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 219, 104
Stat. 2492-500 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k) (1988 & Supp. V 1993));
First Submission of the United States to the Panel in United States-Stan-
dards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, at 12 [hereinafter Sub-
mission of the United States] (on file with the Minnesota Journal of Global
Trade). Harmful chemicals in gasoline form ground-level ozone, commonly re-
ferred to as smog. Studies have shown that ozone damages tissue and cells. It
affects people by reducing lung function and causing chest pain, coughing, nau-
sea, and pulmonary congestion. Researchers have also made findings of crop
yield loss and damage to trees as a result of ozone. OFFICE OF AiR QuALITY
PLANNING & STANDARDS, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, PuB. No. 450-R-92-
001, NATIONAL AIR QuALITY AND EMISSION TRENDS REPORT, 1991 10-11 (1992);
Submission of the United States 13, 73.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k)(8)(A) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
5. See infra notes 22-31 and accompanying text.
6. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Opened for signature Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5,6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, art. III:4 [hereinafter
GATT].
7. Venezuela Plans Challenge in GATT Protesting U.S. Reformulated Gas
Rule, 11 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 37, at 1442 (Sept. 21, 1994); Brazil Files
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finding that the regulation discriminated in violation of GATT
provisions. 8
Environmentalists and proponents of free trade have often
been at odds, and this tension seems to be increasing. Because
the gasoline regulation concerns an environmental measure, it
represents an important dispute between the two groups. The
rule also raises issues of product characterization and regula-
tion, as well as notions of political feasibilty.
This Note will discuss issues raised by the dispute over the
gasoline regulation and consider the WTO Panel's conclusions.
The first section describes the background of the U.S. gasoline
regulation and GATT jurisprudence under Article III and Article
XX. The second section outlines the gasoline dispute and the
decision of the WTO Panel. The third section analyzes the gaso-
line regulation under GATT Article III:4 and Article XX(b), and
considers questions arising from the dispute.
I. THE GATT CHALLENGE TO THE GASOLINE
REGULATION
A. THE U.S. GAsoINE REGULATION
The CAA designates that nine highly-populated areas of the
United States will be "non-attainment areas."9 Gasoline sold in
these areas must be "reformulated" to reduce harmful emissions
below the levels present in 1990 gasoline. 10 The CAA refers to
gasoline that meets this standard as reformulated gasoline
(RFG). 1" In the other, less-populated areas of the United States,
Congress hoped to keep pollution levels from worsening and
therefore required only that the gasoline be as clean as average
Second WTO Complaint Against U.S. Gas Regulations, INSIDE U.S. TRADE,
June 2, 1995, at 8.
8. WTO Dispute Settlement Panel, United States Standards for Reformu-
lated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc., WT/DS2/R (Jan. 29, 1996) [herein-
after Gasoline Decision]. The United States filed an appeal on Feb. 21, 1996.
Although the decision was based on Articles III and XX, the United States has
appealed only under Article XX. Administration Appeals WTO Decision on U.S.
Gasoline Regulations, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Feb. 23, 1996, at 13.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k)(10)(D) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The non-attainment
areas represent approximately one-third of the gasoline consumed in the
United States. Oversight of the Reformulated Gasoline Rule, Hearing Before the
Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 44
(1994) (testimony of Mary Nichols, Assistant Administrator for Air and Radia-
tion, EPA) [hereinafter Nichols].
10. Submission of the United States, supra note 3, 1.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k)(10)(E) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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1990 gasoline. The CAA refers to gasoline with these "non-deg-
radation" requirements as "conventional" gasoline.' 2
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is responsible
for administering a program to enforce the CAA.' 3 The EPA is-
sued its Final Rule (the gasoline regulation) on December 15,
1993.14 The gasoline regulation establishes baseline require-
ments for foreign and domestic refiners and importers.15
The program for RFG began with a "simple model" that en-
tered into effect in 1995 and will be replaced by the "complex
model" in 1998.16 Under the simple model, refiners must pro-
duce gasoline that meets specific requirements for several con-
stituents of RFG, including Reid Vapor Pressure, oxygen
content, benzene content, and aromatic content. 17 The CAA
does not provide specifications, however, for sulfur, olefins, and
T90.18 These constituents are governed by a "non-degradation"
standard, which requires that the amounts of these components
do not exceed 1990 levels. 19 The complex model, however, does
not apply the "non-degradation standard" to any properties.
When the complex model takes effect in 1998, all RFG ingredi-
12. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k)(10)(F) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k)(8)(A) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The CAA states,
"[w]ithin 1 year after November 15, 1990, the Administrator [of the Environ-
mental Protection Agency] shall promulgate regulations applicable to each re-
finer, blender, or importer of gasoline .... " Id.
14. Reformulated Gasoline, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight
and Investigations of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess. H3 (1994) (testimony of Sally Katzen, Administrator, Office of
Management and Budget) [hereinafter Katzen]. The EPA had been working on
a method of compliance since 1991. Id. at 42. In 1993, after at least one exten-
sion, a federal district court set December 15, 1993 as a deadline. Id. at 45.
15. Regulation of Fuel and Fuel Additives: Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, 40 C.F.R. § 80.91 (1995).
16. Nichols, supra note 9, at 45-46.
17. Id. at 45; Summary of the Submission of the Government of the Repub-
lic of Venezuela to the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel in United States-Meas-
ures on Gasoline, at 2-3 (June 1995) [hereinafter Submission of Venezuela] (on
file with the Minnesota Journal of Global Trade).
18. Nichols, supra note 9; Submission of Venezuela, supra note 17, at 2-3.
Sulfur and olefins are chemical compounds. T90 is a distillation property. Spe-
cifically, it is the temperature at which 90% of gasoline evaporates, measured in
Fahrenheit degrees. Id.
19. Nichols, supra note 9; Submission of Venezuela, supra note 17, at 2-3.
The EPA did not include those three components in the statutory requirements
due to a lack of data regarding their effects on the environment. Submission of
the United States, supra note 3, 23; Submission of Venezuela, supra note 17,
at 8. The EPA wanted to allow refineries to continue production and prepare
for the future. The simple model approach thus seemed to be the best solution.
Id. at 8.
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ents - including sulfur, olefins, and T90 - must meet specific
requirements for reformulated gasoline. 20
Conventional gasoline, which accounts for approximately
two-thirds of all gasoline consumed in the United States, need
not be reformulated, but must maintain 1990 quality levels for
all ingredients. 21 All properties, therefore, must meet non-deg-
radation requirements. While the time period for the simple
model was set at three years, no limit was placed on the conven-
tional gasoline program. 22
The non-degradation program, that certain constituents
may not exceed 1990 levels, contains the discriminatory provi-
sion of the gasoline regulation.23 Each refiner is assigned maxi-
mum amounts of ozone-forming ingredients that can be
contained in the gasoline it sells. These maximum amounts are
"baseline characteristics." The gasoline regulation sets levels
for each gasoline constituent in a "statutory baseline" and also
prescribes various methods for refiners to calculate their own,
individual baselines. 24
20. Id. The baseline gasoline fuel properties are:
API Gravity ...................... 57.4
Sulfur, ppm ..................... 339.
Benzene, % ...................... 1.53
RVP, psi ......................... 8.7
Octane, R + M/2 .................. 87.3
IBP, F ........................... 91.
10% , F .......................... 128.
50% , F .......................... 218.
90%, F .......................... 330.
End Point, F.....................415.
Aromatics, % ..................... 32.0
Olefins, % ....................... 9.2
Suturates, %.....................58.8
42 U.S.C. § 7545(k)(10)(B)(i) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
21. Submission of the United States, supra note 3, 28.
22. Submission of Venezuela, supra note 17, at 4.
23. Submission of the United States, supra note 3, 2. For RFG, non-deg-
radation requirements only apply to sulfur, olefins, and T90. For conventional
gasoline, however, all constituents are subject to the non-degradation require-
ments, which are set by the EPA in the gasoline regulation. The alleged dis-
crimination in the conventional gasoline program therefore, applies to all
gasoline components, and continues for an indefinite period of time, rather than
a limited period, like the RFG program. See supra text accompanying notes 18-
22.
24. Rules and Regulations, Environmental Protection Agency, 59 Fed. Reg.
7716, 7785 (1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 80). The goals of the gasoline
regulation include (1) avoiding options for refiners, which would allow them to
choose between compliance techniques, and (2) obtaining accurate and reliable
data. Id. The first goal responds to concerns that if refiners and importers
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Any refiner, foreign or domestic, with adequate data on
their 1990 gasoline components may set an individual base-
line.25 These baselines will equal the average levels of certain
constituents in the refiner's own 1990 gasoline. 26 The vast ma-
jority of domestic and foreign refiners, however, lack the neces-
sary records to calculate individual baselines, 27 because in 1990
there was no requirement to maintain such records. 28
When actual data does not exist, domestic refiners may fig-
ure their individual baselines through modeling techniques that
supplement missing data with more accessible, post-1990 infor-
mation. 29 Foreign refiners, however, may not supplement miss-
ing data with the other modeling techniques. If they cannot
compute the baseline using only 1990 records, they must follow
the "statutory baseline," set out in the gasoline regulation. 30
could select which method to use, they would choose the simplest method,
which likely would result in dirtier overall gasoline. Id at 7785-86.
25. 40 C.F.R. § 80.91(b)(3) (1995). The use of the data is method 1 under
the gasoline regulation: "Method 1-type data shall consist of quality (composi-
tion and property data) and volume records of gasoline produced in or shipped
from the refinery in 1990, excluding exported gasoline." Id. § 80.91(c)(1)(i). "A
refiner or importer must determine a baseline fuel parameter value using only
Method 1-type data if sufficient Method 1-type data is available .... " Id.
§ 80.91(c)(4)(i).
26. Id. § 80.91(c)(1). In regard to the lack of records by importers, the EPA
Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation, Mary Nichols, said: "We expect
that few, if any, importers will have adequate 1990 test data." Nichols, supra
note 9, at 46.
27. Rules and Regulations, Environmental Protection Agency, 59 Fed. Reg.
7716, 7785 (1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 80). Necessary records would
include data on amounts and percentages of (1) volatile organic compounds, (2)
oxides of nitrogen, (3) carbon monoxide, and (4) toxic air pollutants in gasoline
sold in 1990. 42 U.S.C. § 7545 (k)(8)(A) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
28. Submission of the United States, supra note 3, 33.
29. 40 C.F.R. § 80.91(c) (1995). The regulation provides:
Method 2-type data shall consist of 1990 gasoline blendstock quality
data and 1990 blendstock production records ... Method 3-type data
shall consist of post-1990 gasoline blendstock and/or gasoline quality
data and 1990 blendstock and gasoline production records... If a re-
finer has insufficient Method 1-type data for a baseline parameter
value determination, it must supplement that data with all available
Method 2-type data, until it has sufficient data . . .If a refiner has
insufficient Method 1- and Method 2-type data for a baseline parame-
ter value determination, it must supplement that data with available
Method 3-type data, until it has sufficient data.
Id. § 80.91(c)(2)-(4).
30. Id. § 80.91(b)(4)(iii). This section provides: "An importer which cannot
meet the criteria of... [the sections providing for use of adequate 1990 data, or
for importers who are also foreign refiners] for baseline determination shall
have the parameter values listed in section (c)(5) [the statutory baseline re-
quirements]." Id.; see also GATT Panel to Hear Venezuelan Complaint Against
Clean Air Rules, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Oct. 7, 1994, at 4.
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This statutory baseline represents the average level of the con-
stituents contained in all gasoline consumed in the United
States in 1990.3 1
The different baseline techniques require foreign refiners to
meet average 1990 standards, which may require cleaner gaso-
line than they had previously produced. In contrast, U.S. refin-
ers that produced dirtier gasoline than the 1990 average may
continue to produce the dirtier gasoline, based on their individ-
ual baseline averages. 32
Justifications for limiting use of individual baselines to do-
mestic refiners include feasibility and enforcement. 33 The EPA
considered modeling technically infeasible for foreign refiners.
For instance, foreign sources and production processes have
often changed since 1990, and the modeling methods are not
designed to account for changes. 34 Also, establishing the refin-
ery of origin would prove extremely difficult, because importers
often mix gasoline from several refineries.35 In addition, foreign
refiners would need to keep separate data for the portion of gas-
oline destined for the United States. Foreign refiners and blend-
ers do not have adequate data to set their own baselines under
the modeling technique, and therefore, the EPA found individ-
ual baselines by foreign refiners to be infeasible. Enforcement
problems arise because U.S. officials may inspect and monitor
domestic refineries, but have no similar power over foreign
refineries.3 6
Venezuela, as the largest exporter of gasoline to the United
States, represents five percent of the U.S. gasoline market.3 7
Venezuelan gasoline, however, contains nearly three times the
percentage of olefins allowed for imported gasoline under the
1990 statutory baseline. 38 Venezuelan officials predicted that
31. Nichols, supra note 9, at 46-47.
32. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text (detailing baseline re-
quirements for U.S. refiners).
33. Rules and Regulations, Environmental Protection Agency, 59 Fed. Reg.
7716, 7785-86 (1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 80).
34. Id.
35. Id.; Submission of the United States, supra note 3, 92.
36. Submission of the United States, supra note 3, 97, 98.
37. EPA Announces Fuel Plan for Venezuela; Threatened GATT Complaint
is Shelved, 11 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 504 (Mar. 30, 1994). The state-
owned company, Petriols de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA), exports to the U.S.
through Citgo Petroleum Corporation.
38. Id. Venezuelan gasoline contains 29.8% olefins, but the statutory base-
line, representing the average of all 1990 gasoline, limits olefins to 9.2% as of
January 1, 1995. Venezuela Files Request for Dispute Settlement Panel in Gaso-
line Issue, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 429 (Mar. 16, 1994). Ironically,
420 [Vol. 5:415
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their RFG exports would decrease by $150 million per year due
to the baseline rule.3 9
Venezuela raised a challenge to the differing baseline stan-
dards before the EPA issued the gasoline regulation in 1993.40
The EPA, however, did not have time to address the Venezuelan
challenge before the court-imposed deadline for the gasoline reg-
ulation.4 1 EPA officials fully expected to pursue negotiations af-
ter issuing the regulation. 42 In 1994, under threat of a GATT
challenge, the EPA and Venezuela reached a compromise which
would have allowed Venezuela to use the same modeling method
of setting individual baselines for RFG as U.S. refiners.43 In ex-
change, Venezuela agreed to withdraw any GATT challenge and
limit its quantity of U.S. gasoline exports to 1990 levels. 44
The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) sup-
ported the EPA compromise. 45 USTR officials emphasized that
it affected only the simple model under the RFG program, span-
ning three years. 46 Several U.S. senators and environmental or-
PDVSA modified its refineries to reduce olefin content below the level in its
1990 gasoline. Nichols, supra note 9, at 48. If they were allowed to model,
therefore, modifications would not be necessary. See id. at 44-53.
39. Venezuela Moves Toward WTO Case in Reformulated Gas Dispute, IN-
SIDE U.S. TRADE, Feb. 3, 1995, at 4.
40. Katzen, supra note 14, at 45-46.
41. Nichols, supra note 9, at 49.
42. Id.
43. Proposed Rules, Environmental Protection Agency, 59 Fed. Reg.
22,800, 22,801 (1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 80). The EPA proposal pro-
vided that:
While EPA does not necessarily agree with PDVSA position on GATT
requirements, EPA desires to remove the uncertainty in this regard
and we believe the proposal does that in a manner fully protective of
human health and the environment.... Under today's proposal im-
porters would be allowed limited use of a baseline established for an
individual foreign refinery ....
Id.
44. Improper White House Pressure Prompts EPA Plan for Venezuela,
Baucus Charges, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 17 at 659, 659-60 (Apr. 27,
1994). Although Venezuela agreed to cap exports at 1990 levels, experts have
noted that Venezuelan exports to the U.S. were 200% higher in 1990 than in
1993. Id. Venezuela, therefore, did not sacrifice at all when making this bar-
gain, since it is unlikely their gasoline exports to the United States would have
been higher than in 1990 even without the compromise requirement. Also, the
import cap would appear to contradict the Agreement on Safeguards.
45. EPA Announces Fuel Plan for Venezuela, supra note 37.
46. USTR Official Says Deal With Venezuela on Reformulated Gasoline is
Temporary, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 549 (Apr. 6, 1994). By 1998 all
refiners of RFG must meet the same statutory standards for pollutant quanti-
ties, and individual baselines will no longer apply. Id. The proposal did not
affect the conventional gasoline program.
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ganizations, however, spoke out against the compromise, 47
noting several problems. First, they charged that the compro-
mise would result in lower air quality, in direct conflict with the
goal of the 1993 gasoline regulation. 48 Second, senators opposed
the agreement because the EPA developed it secretly, in con-
trast to the usual U.S. rule-making procedure. 49 Third, many
showed skepticism because the compromise included a quota
provision, which free trade proponents generally disfavor.50 In
September 1994, Congress halted funding for the proposed com-
promise regulation, effectively leaving the EPA no choice but to
abandon it.51
With the defeat of the EPA compromise, Venezuela brought
the dispute before the WTO,52 charging that the gasoline regula-
tion violates Article III of the GATT, as well as Article I and the
Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement.53 USTR officials de-
fended the EPA gasoline regulation, claiming that it does not
violate GATT, or, alternatively, that Article XX justifies any
violations.5 4
B. OVERVIEW OF GATT JURISPRUDENCE
Obligations under the GATT limit the ability of contracting
countries to enact environmental policies which may have a dis-
47. Baucus to Investigate EPA Plan on Venezuelan Reformulated Fuel, 11
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 15 at 584 (Apr. 13, 1994). Senator Max Baucus
(Montana) and the rest of the Senate Environmental and Public Works Com-
mittee decided to investigate the EPA/Venezuela compromise. Id.
48. Steve Charnovitz, Symposium, Free Trade, Fair Trade, Green Trade:
Defogging the Debate, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 459, 522 (1994); Plan for Venezue-
lan Reformulated Fuel Will Undergo Investigation, Senator Says, Env't Rep.
(BNA) No. 19, at 2072 (Apr. 8, 1994).
49. EPA Announces Fuel Plan for Venezuela, supra note 37.
50. Charnovitz, supra note 48, at 522. The cap on Venezuelan imports con-
stitutes the quota provision. But see supra note 44.
51. Venezuela Plans Challenge in GATT Protesting U.S. Reformulated Gas
Rule, supra note 7, at 1442. The USTR defended the EPA compromise as a
proposal, rather than a final resolution. See Nichols, supra note 9, at 26-33.
Comments from many sources, including Venezuela, later concluded the com-
promise would have been infeasible for foreign refiners. Submission of the
United States, supra note 3, 1 101.
52. Venezuela Moves Toward WTO Case in Reformulated Gas Dispute,
supra note 39, at 4.
53. Submission of Venezuela, supra note 17, at 5.
54. RFG Imports Hearings Begin This Week, as U.S. Sends Volley, OCTANE
WK., July 10, 1995, available in WESTLAW, Octanewk database; U.S. Defends
Gas Rules in WTO Against Charges of Discrimination, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, July
7, 1995, at 8-9.
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criminatory effect on trade.55 Disputes between environmental-
ists and proponents of free trade have arisen in several
contexts. 56 Environmentalists claim that trade obligations limit
the government's ability to control polluting companies and
products, and that this inability renders many environmental
laws useless.57 Challenges to environmental laws have had a
high rate of success under the GATT. 5 8 For example, two GATT
panels found the challenged regulation in the Tuna/Dolphin dis-
pute to violate the GATT.5 9 An environmental dispute concern-
ing product standards arguably had not arisen, however, until
the U.S. gasoline regulation challenge. 60
Environmental groups such as the Center for International
Environmental Law (CIEL) supported a strong U.S. stance in
defending the gasoline regulation.6 1 CIEL stated that the U.S.
rule properly protects the environment for purposes of health
and safety, and that any WTO ruling in favor of Venezuela
would constitute a serious overreaching of its scope. 62
GATT Article III:4 prohibits adverse discrimination against
foreign products as compared to similar domestic products.
63
55. Charnovitz, supra note 48, at 467.
56. William Snape III & Naomi Lefkovitz, Symposium, Searching for
GATs Environmental Miranda: Are "Process Standards" Getting "Due Pro-
cess?, " 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 777, 777-82 (1994).
57. Charnovitz, supra note 48, at 468-70.
58. Id. at 469. In six out of nine disputes challenging government meas-
ures claimed to have been "environmental," the party complaining that the en-
vironmental regulation violated the GATT has been successful. Those
regulations include import bans on tuna, herring, and cigarettes. The three
regulations which have been upheld as legal took the form of either a border tax
adjustment or an excise tax. Id.
59. Id. Under GATT, a country may regulate imported products, but it
may not regulate the process of obtaining and making the imported product.
GATT Dispute Resolution Panel, United States-Restrictions on Imports of
Tuna From Mexico, GATT Doc. DS21/R, BISD 39th Supp. 155, 5.13-5.15
(1993).
60. Charnovitz, supra note 48, at 469.
61. Environmentalists Seek Strong Defense to Venezuela WTO Challenge,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, May 19, 1995, at 19.
62. Id, at 19-20.
63. Article III:4 provides:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no
less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in
respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their inter-
nal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use
GATT, supra note 6, art. II:4.
1996]
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Several GATT dispute panels have interpreted Article III, which
provides for national treatment of imported products.
To decide if Article III applies, panel members ask whether
the law or regulation at issue differentiates between like prod-
ucts of foreign and domestic origin. 64 Facially discriminatory
regulations which differentiate, by their language, between for-
eign and domestic like products, clearly fall within the scope of
Article III:4. In Canada - Administration of the Foreign In-
vestment Review Act, the Panel found clear discrimination on
the face of the statute; it concluded that the provision "ex-
clude[d] the possibility of purchasing available imported prod-
ucts so that the latter are clearly treated less favorably than
domestic products and that such requirements are therefore not
consistent with Article III:4."65
Panels will not automatically invalidate discriminatory
treatment. If the panel finds differentiation between like prod-
ucts, it asks whether the discrimination adversely affects the
foreign product. In cases involving facially discriminatory treat-
ment, the defending party must meet a high standard of proof to
show that the different treatment neutralizes an otherwise ad-
verse effect. Panels have interpreted Article III:4 to require,
therefore, that competitive conditions be equal for both foreign
and domestic like products. 66
For example, the regulation in EEC - Measures on Animal
Feed Proteins, which required administrative documentation for
imported products but not domestic products, constituted formal
64. See, e.g., GATT Dispute Resolution Panel, Canada-Administration of
the Foreign Investment Review Act, GATT Doc. L/5504, BISD 30th Supp. 140
5.7 (1984) (panel report adopted Feb. 7, 1984).
65. Id. at 5.8. The dispute considered several regulations restricting
transactions in Canada. For instance, Canada had made undertakings to
purchase goods of Canadian origin. Id. '1 5.7.
66. See, e.g., GATT Dispute Resolution Panel, Italian Discrimination
Against Imported Agricultural Machinery, GATT Doc. L/833, BISD 7th Supp.
60 (1959) (panel report adopted Oct. 23, 1958); GATT Dispute Resolution
Panel, Canada-Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act, GATT
Doc. 1/5504, BISD 30th Supp. 140 (1984) (panel report adopted Feb. 7, 1984);
GATT Dispute Resolution Panel, Canada-Import, Distribution and Sale of
Certain Alcoholic Drinks by Provincial Marketing Agencies, GATT Doc. DS17/R,
BISD 39th Supp. 27 (1993) (panel report adopted Feb. 18, 1992); GATT Dispute
Resolution Panel, United States-Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Bever-
ages, GATT Doc. DS23/R BISD 39th Supp. 206 (1993) (panel report adopted
June 19, 1992).
424 [Vol. 5:415
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discrimination. 67 The Panel went on to conclude, however, that
the administrative requirements did not afford less favorable
treatment to foreign products. 68 The Panel, therefore, accepted
the differentiation as a way to prevent adverse effects.
In United States - Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, a
GATT panel analyzed equal competitive conditions. The com-
plaining party challenged the different U.S. procedures for intel-
lectual property disputes involving foreign products, as opposed
to disputes involving domestic products.6 9 The Panel inter-
preted the "no less favorable" clause of Article III:4 to mean that
"the mere fact that imported products are subject . . .to legal
provisions that are different from those applying to products of
national origin is in itself not conclusive." 70 The Panel ex-
plained that "there may be cases where application of formally
identical legal provisions would in practice accord less favorable
treatment to imported products."71
In another recent GATT dispute, the United States argued
that a Canadian provision restricting the private delivery of for-
eign beer violated the national treatment clause. 72 Canada de-
fended the law by arguing that although the regulations for
foreign and provincial beer differed, the discrimination did not
constitute less favorable treatment.7 3 The Panel found that the
"mere fact that imported and domestic beer were subject to dif-
ferent delivery systems was not, in itself, conclusive in establish-
ing inconsistency with Article III:4." 74 The Panel placed the
burden of proof on Canada to show that foreign and domestic
beer enjoyed equal competitive opportunities. 75 The Panel con-
cluded that since foreign brewers did not have the same options
67. GATT Dispute Resolution Panel, EEC-Measures on Animal Feed Pro-
teins, GATT Doc. BISD 25th Supp. 49 4.72 (1978) (panel report adopted Mar.
14 1978).
68. Id. The treatment was not less favorable, because additional adminis-
trative requirements were placed on domestic producers, so that the effect of
the differentiation in the disputed regulation made competitive conditions
equal, rather than allowing an advantage to foreign producers. Id.
69. GATT Dispute Resolution Panel, United States-Section 337 of the
TariffAct of 1930, GATT Doc. L/6439 BISD 36th Supp. 345 1.3 (1990) (panel
report adopted Nov. 7, 1989).
70. Id. 5.11.
71. Id.
72. GATT Dispute Resolution Panel, Canada-Import, Distribution and
Sale of Certain Alcoholic Drinks by Provincial Marketing Agencies, GATT Doc.
DS17/R, BISD 39th Supp. 27 (1993) (panel report adopted Feb. 18, 1992).
73. Id. 5.11.
74. Id. 1 5.12.
75. Id. T 5.12, 5.14.
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as domestic brewers, they were placed at a competitive disad-
vantage in violation of Article III:4.76
If a violation of a GATT provision, such as Article III:4, has
been shown, panels will consider possible justifications under
Article XX.7 7 Article XX allows countries to adopt measures in
violation of the GATT, if such measures are "necessary" for the
protection of life or health, enforcement of other laws, or preser-
vation of natural resources. The country invoking the exception
has the burden of proof under Article XX. 78
Article XX(d) does not justify a regulation, inconsistent with
Article III, if an alternative, non-violative measure exists. 79
Even if no GATT consistent method exists, the regulation is not
necessary under Article XX(d) if a less inconsistent measure is
available.80 In other words, the measure is not "necessary" if
the party reasonably could be expected to use a GATT consistent
or less GATT inconsistent means of bringing about the result.81
In the Thailand Cigarette case, the Panel stated that "neces-
76. Id. 5.14, 5.16. The Panel also considered minimum prices set by Can-
ada on beer in certain provinces. Id. 5.27. The Panel determined that
although the minimum prices were equal for domestic and foreign products,
they did not accord equality of competitive conditions. Some foreign beer could
be sold more cheaply than the minimum, so the regulation had the effect of
denying their competitive advantage. Id. 5.30.
77. See, e.g., GATT Dispute Resolution Panel, United States-Section 337
of the Tariff Act of 1930, GATT Doc. L/6439 BISD 36th Supp. 345 1 5.9 (1990)
(panel report adopted Nov. 7,1989). Article XX provides:
[Niothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption
or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:...
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;...
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are
not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, ...
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domes-
tic production or consumption; ....
GATT, supra note 6, at art. XX.
78. GATT Dispute Resolution Panel, United States-Measures Affecting
Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, GAT Doc. DS23/R BISD 39th Supp. 206 1 5.41
(1993) (panel report adopted June 19, 1992).
79. GATT Dispute Resolution Panel, United States-Section 337 of the
TariffAct of 1930, GATT Doc. L/6439 BISD 36th Supp. 345 1 5.26 (1990) (panel
report adopted Nov. 7, 1989).
80. Id. "[1n cases where a measure consistent with other GATT provisions
is not reasonably available, a contracting party is bound to use, among the
measures reasonably available to it, that which entails the least degree of in-
consistency with other GATT provisions." Id.
81. Id.
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sary" under Article XX(b) should be interpreted the same as
under Article XX(d).8 2
II. UNITED STATES - STANDARDS FOR
REFORMULATED AND CONVENTIONAL
GASOLINE
Venezuela focused its challenge on adverse discrimination
under Article III:4. In evaluating the Article III:4 claim, the
WTO Panel found that the regulation affected the use of goods.8 3
The Panel then turned to the issue of whether the EPA regula-
tion treats foreign gasoline less favorably than domestic gaso-
line.8 4 Venezuela argued that the regulation leaves them only
two choices. First, they can make changes in their refining,
which would be extremely costly, and would adversely affect
their competitive position in the U.S. market.8 5 Second, they
can sell their "dirty" gasoline to an importer as blendstock gaso-
line. Because the importer must have enough cleaner gasoline
to offset its dirtier gasoline, so that the average quality conforms
with the statute, blendstock is purchased at a much lower
price.86 Venezuela argued that setting an individual baseline
through modeling would be an easier option, since they would
not have to alter inputs, processes, or physical plant condi-
82. GATT Dispute Resolution Panel, Thailand-Restrictions on Importa-
tion of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, BISD 37th Supp. 200, T 74 (panel re-
port adopted Nov. 7, 1990). It used a reasonable standard and stated that the
measure would be necessary "only if there were no alternative measure consis-
tent with the General Agreement, or less inconsistent with it, which Thailand
could reasonably be expected to employ to achieve its health policy objectives."
Id. 75. The Panel decided a regulation to ban the importation of cigarettes for
health reasons violated Article XX(b). Id. 81.
83. Gasoline Decision, supra note 8, 6.5.
84. Id. Before analyzing less favorable treatment, the Panel decided that
foreign and domestic gasoline constitute like products. Id. 6.9. Although both
parties seemed to have conceded like product, the Panel addressed the U.S. as-
sertion that the gasoline regulation treats similarly situated parties similarly
as an argument against like product. Id. 6.6. The Panel refused, however, to
substitute a similarly situated test for the traditional like product test, which
compares the products based on factors such as nature, quality, and use. Id.
6.8. The Panel relied on the traditional like product test set forth in the 1987
Japan Alcohol case. Id. Unaccountably, the Panel ignored other, more recent
panel reports, which applied a different test for like product. See infra note 109.
85. Submission of Venezuela, supra note 17, at 9.
86. See id. at 9-10. Brazil also argued that the regulation violated Article
III:4, because they only could sell their gasoline as blendstock, and thus earn
less. Gasoline Decision, supra note 8, 3.16.
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tions.87 Venezuela also claimed that the United States itself
had repeatedly recognized the adverse effects of the discrimina-
tion.88 For example, Mary Nichols, the EPA Assistant Adminis-
trator for Air and Radiation, admitted to the U.S. Congress that
the regulation discriminated against foreign refiners.8 9
As a defense to the Article III:4 claim, the United States
argued that the rule does not treat importers and domestic refin-
ers differently "overall."90 Since the baseline for importers
equals the average quality of all 1990 U.S. gasoline, roughly half
of U.S. gasoline will be cleaner than the foreign gasoline. 91 The
Panel rejected the U.S. "overall equal" argument by applying the
reasoning of the Section 337 case, which said that more
favorable treatment cannot be balanced with less favorable
treatment to achieve an equal result. 92
The USTR officials also argued that the different treatment
does not result in less favorable treatment.93 They claimed that
most foreign refiners do not have adequate data to use modeling
techniques and would therefore be forced out of the market
under an individual baseline system.94 The statutory baseline,
87. Submission of Venezuela, supra note 17, at 10. This solution is what
the EPA compromise allowed. The PDVSA has shown it could determine an
individual baseline, would allow for monitoring of compliance, and could figure
the refinery-of-origin. Id. at 17.
88. Id. at 11.
89. She stated:
[Tihe issue that we've been trying to focus on .. . is do we have an
adequate justification for discriminating against one category of refin-
ers, that is foreign refiners against domestic refiners.... Clearly, Vene-
zuela prefers to use its own baseline rather than to use the average
baseline provided under the December rule, because they will then
have to do only the same amount of reformulating that they had
planned to do if they were treated the same as domestic refiners.
Id. at 12 (quoting Oversight of the Reformulated Gasoline Rule: Hearing Before
the Committee on Environment and Public Works United States Senate, 103d
Cong., 2nd Sess. 15, 22-23 (1994) (statement of Mary D. Nichols, Assistant Ad-
ministrator, EPA) (emphasis added).
90. Submission of the United States, supra note 3, T 47; PDVSA, Feds
Fight it Out Over RFG Baseline Rule, 32 U.S. OIL WK., July 17, 1995, available
in WESTLAW, USOilwk database.
91. Submission of the United States, supra note 3, 47, 48.
92. Gasoline Decision, supra note 8, 6.14.
93. Submission of the United States, supra note 3, 99 47-50.
94. Id. T 52-56 Importers, blenders, and domestic refiners with limited
businesses in 1990 are similarly situated in their lack of information for model-
ing. None of them have reliably established 1990 gasoline qualities. Id. 52.
Blenders and importers have inadequate data for methods 2 and 3 of the model-
ing techniques, because they rely on a multitude of sources. Id. 54. Refinery
of origin problems, and varying gasoline quality and sources mean subsequent
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therefore, may actually help some foreign refiners export gaso-
line to the United States.
The Panel agreed with the Venezuelan position and decided
that the regulation constitutes adverse discrimination by reduc-
ing opportunities for some that are available for others, thereby
worsening their competitive condition. 9 5
The United States further argued that three provisions of
Article XX apply and provide justifications for GATT viola-
tions.9 6 The WTO Panel, however, rejected the defenses. 97 The
Panel dismissed the arguments raised under Article XX(d) and
XX(g) rather quickly and devoted most of its attention to Article
XX(b). 98
The United States argued the discriminatory effects of the
gasoline regulation are justified under Article XX(b), as the only
available means to enforce the CAA amendments, which are
necessary to protect human life and health.99 The Panel listed
three elements the regulation must satisfy under Article XX(b):
(1) the regulation must fall within the policies that XX(b) was
designed to cover; (2) the regulation must be necessary for the
protection of life or health; and (3) the regulation must meet the
requirements of the introductory clause of Article XX. 10 0 The
Panel agreed with the parties that the first element had been
data would not accurately show 1990 quality. Id. By contrast, domestic gaso-
line has a consistent source and quality. Id. 55.
95. Gasoline Decision, supra note 8, 6.10.
96. Submission of the United States, supra note 3, 69-128.
97. Gasoline Decision, supra note 8, 8.1.
98. Gasoline Decision, supra note 8. Under Article XX(d) the United States
cited problems with enforcement and "gaming." Submission of the United
States, supra note 3, 117, 120. Gaming is the fear that if refiners were al-
lowed to choose whether to model or to follow the statutory baseline, the envi-
ronment would suffer from each refiner choosing the less stringent method. See
Nichols, supra note 9, at 47-48. For Article XX(d), the Panel decided the regula-
tion was not covered by that section, because the regulation was not an enforce-
ment mechanism of the CAA, but simply rules for determining baselines. It
facilitated compliance, rather than enforced it. Gasoline Decision, supra note 8,
6.33.
Under Article XX(g) the United States argued clean air is an exhaustible
natural resource. Id. 6.36. The Panel decided that Article XX(g) covered the
gasoline regulation, but was not satisfied to allow the discrimination, because
the discriminatory features of the regulation were not "primarily aimed at" con-
serving clean air. Id. 6.40. In its appeal, the USTR will focus on its Article
XX defense. Administration Appeals WTO Decision on U.S. Gasoline Regula-
tions, supra note 8, at 13.
99. Submission of the United States, supra note 3, 71.
100. Gasoline Decision, supra note 8, 6.20.
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satisfied10 1 and then considered whether the means chosen to
bring about the goals of the CAA were "necessary" for the fulfill-
ment of the environmental purpose.10 2
The Panel called attention to the Section 337 case in which
the Panel defined "necessary" under Article XX as an absence of
an alternative measure which the country could reasonably be
expected to employ. 103 If all methods reasonably available
would be GATT inconsistent, the country should use the least
inconsistent method.' 0 4 Thus, if either consistent or less incon-
sistent alternatives existed, the regulation could not be consid-
ered necessary. l0 5
The gasoline Panel concluded that either of two alternative
techniques would be reasonable. The United States could set a
single statutory baseline, or allow all refiners to set individual
baselines. 10 6 The Panel found that the United States had not
satisfied its burden of showing that foreign refiners could not set
individual baselines,' 0 7 or that enforcement problems made the
regulation necessary.' 0
The Panel decided it need not consider the third element of
Article XX(b), whether the regulation fit within the introductory
clause of the Article. It also did not consider the claims brought
by Venezuela under Article 1:1 of the GATT and under the Tech-
nical Barriers to Trade Agreement. 10 9
101. Id. 6.21
102. Id. 6.22.
103. Id. 6.24.
104. Id.
105. Id. 6.24.
106. Id. 6.25. The United States claimed the individual baselines were a
"logical and practical" way to carry out the CAA. Submission of the United
States, supra note 3, 79. If a single baseline were required, the results would
be the same, an average quality equal to the average in 1990 gasoline. Id. A
greater number of refiners, however, would need to adjust procedures.
The United States argued that the regulation limits the use of individual
baselines to domestic refiners for feasibility and enforcement reasons. Id. 9
92-95. Many importers do not have enough data to calculate the baselines, and
also would have trouble accounting for the refinery of origin of the gasoline. Id.
92. In addition, they argued that they could not adequately enforce compli-
ance with an individual baseline program for importers. Id. 95.
107. Gasoline Decision, supra note 8, 6.26.
108. The United States has available data of importers regarding gasoline
quality. The Panel decided that the United States did not show that this data
was inherently unreliable to enforce compliance. Id. % 6.28.
109. Id. 6.29, 6.19, 6.43. By avoiding the TBT issue, the Panel escaped
some unanswered and potentially troubling questions, such as what constitutes
a technical regulation, whether a discriminatory measure connected to a techni-
cal regulation is covered by the TBT, and whether GATT Article XX is applica-
ble under the TBT.
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III. ANALYSIS OF ISSUES ARISING UNDER THE
GASOLINE DISPUTE
The Panel's decision adequately disposes of the rather nar-
row issue presented by the facts. The dispute, however, also
raises some interesting questions about GATT's broader impact
on environmental regulation. Although the Panel was not called
upon to address these issues, this Note will attempt to explain
the broader issues and to comment upon them.
A. ANALYSIS OF THE PANEL DECISION
1. The Gasoline Regulation Violates Article III:4
The WTO Panel followed prior panels when it considered
the Article III:4 claim. 110 It first found that the regulation af-
fected the sale or use of gasoline. It then decided that domestic
and foreign gasoline constituted like products, a conclusion con-
ceded by both parties.1 1'
Having found these products to be like, the Panel had little
difficulty finding discrimination between foreign and domestic
gasoline. The gasoline regulation, by its terms, provides differ-
ent rules based on the origin of the gasoline. The different base-
line requirements constitute adverse discrimination, because
they result in costly effects for foreign refiners, such as Vene-
zuela, but do not have a similar effect on domestic refiners.11 2
With the different baseline requirements, Venezuela estimates
its gasoline exports will be reduced by $150 million per year.11 3
The United States argued that the regulation does not dis-
criminate against importers "overall." Because the statutory
baseline represents average 1990 gasoline standards, half of all
the 1990 gasoline should fall above the standard, and half
110. See supra notes 63-76 and accompanying text (outlining the Panels' Ar-
ticle III decisions).
111. Gasoline Decision, supra note 8, 6.5. Although it was not necessary,
the Panel included an extensive dictum about the definition of the term "like
product." Id. 6.5-6.9. The Panel's discussion on this point is likely to engen-
der some confusion over the correct definition, as is explained at length in an-
other note in this issue. See James Snelson, Can GATT Article III Recover
From Its Head-On Collision with United States: Taxes on Automobiles?, 5
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 467 (1996). The Panel here articulated an older like
product test, found in the 1987 Japan Alcohol case, a test which has since been
rejected by several more recent GATT panels. Gasoline Decision, supra note 8,
6.8.
112. See supra notes 83-95 and accompanying text (detailing the Panel's
analysis of less favorable treatment under the gasoline regulation).
113. GATT Panel to Hear Venezuelan Complaint Against Clean Air Rules,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Oct. 7, 1994, at 4.
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should fall below. 114 Even accepting that logic, however, the
regulation would still adversely affect half of the foreign gaso-
line, namely the gasoline on the dirtier side of the average.
None of the U.S. refiners, however, will be impacted in such a
way, since they need not comply with the statutory average. 1" 5
The regulation does not require any adjustments of processes or
conditions by domestic refiners, regardless of which side of the
average they represent. The costs that Venezuela and other for-
eign refiners must bear leaves them in a worse competitive posi-
tion than domestic refiners, and thus the regulation violates
Article III:4.116
2. The Panel's Approach to the Gasoline Regulation Under
Article XX
Since the regulation clearly violates Article III:4, the gaso-
line dispute revolved around the issues that arise under Article
XX, and particularly Article XX(b). The United States' most
powerful and persuasive arguments lie in their affirmative de-
fenses. This section will focus on Article XX(b), and consider the
reasons for the Panel's conclusion that the United States did not
meet its burden of proof under that article.' 1 7
The Panel found that the gasoline regulation was clearly
aimed at protecting life or health, as required by Article
XX(b).118 Studies showed many harmful effects of ozone-form-
ing emissions from gasoline, prompting the. United States to en-
114. Submission of the United States, supra note 3, 47.
115. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
116. The issue of adverse effect was not a difficult one. In cases where a
regulation openly discriminates against foreign goods, previous GATT panels
have ruled that any degree of adverse impact violates Article III. See, e.g.,
GATT Dispute Resolution Panel, United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of
1930, GATT Doc. L/6439, BISD 36th Supp. 345 (1990) (panel report adopted
Nov. 7, 1989); GATT Dispute Resolution Panel, Canada-Import, Distribution
and Sale of Certain Alcoholic Drinks by Provincial Marketing Agencies, GATT
Doc. DS17/R, BISD 39th Supp. 27 (1993) (panel report adopted Feb. 18, 1992);
see also supra notes 63-76 (explaining the Panel's opinion with respect to Arti-
cle III). Interestingly, the U.S. Supreme Court subjects discriminatory state
legislation to similar "strict scrutiny." See Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec,
Free Trade and the Regulatory State: A GAT'1s-Eye View of the Dormant Com-
merce Clause, 47 VAND. L. REv., 1401, 1412 (1994).
117. The Panel was correct in examining only Article XX(b) and dismissing
Article XX(d) and XX(g) more quickly. See Gasoline Decision, supra note 8,
6.33, 6.40. This Note, therefore, will not discuss the application of those provi-
sions to this dispute. See supra note 98 (describing the Panel's treatment of
Article XX(d) and XX(g)).
118. Id. 6.21; see generally 59 Fed. Reg. 7716, 7785, 7785-88 (1994) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. § 80) (proposed Feb. 16, 1994).
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act the 1990 CAA amendments. 119 The gasoline regulation
simply facilitates that statute, allowing it to fulfill its environ-
mental purpose.
The main issue under Article XX was whether a GATT vio-
lation was necessary to effectuate that purpose. Several panel
decisions have held that the issue of "necessary" under Article
XX(d) is a question of reasonable alternatives. 120 The question
of necessity depends on (1) whether the country had any GATT
consistent, or less GATT-inconsistent alternative, and (2)
whether the country could reasonably be expected to use that
alternative method.
The United States did have one clearly GATT-consistent al-
ternative available. That method would involve a single statu-
tory standard, based on the average quality of 1990 gasoline.
The standard would eliminate the discrimination of the gasoline
regulation by requiring both domestic refiners and importers to
follow the same baseline, which the current regulation only re-
quires importers to use. A single statutory baseline would have
no discriminatory trade effects, and would be technically
feasible.
Venezuela and Brazil have also argued that the United
States had another alternative that would eliminate the dis-
criminatory effects of the regulation.' 2 ' All refiners, under that
alternative, would be required to calculate individual baselines
using 1990 data and the modeling technique. If a refiner techni-
cally could not calculate a baseline, even with modeling, that re-
finer would follow the statutory baseline instead. Some refiners,
such as the PDVSA, the state-owned Venezuelan refinery, have
argued that they have sufficient data to construct individual
baselines through modeling.' 22 This program would put them in
an equal competitive position with domestic refiners.' 23
The United States argued that the option was not techni-
cally feasible, because foreign refiners could not prove an indi-
vidual baseline. 124 The Panel, however, disagreed. 25 While it
was likely difficult for the Panel to dispute the United States on
119. See supra note 3 (detailing harmful effects of emissions).
120. See supra notes 77-82 (examining GATT panel decisions under Article
XX).
121. Gasoline Decision, supra note 8, 3.45, 3.46.
122. Id.
123. The Panel seemed to regard this option as less inconsistent with GATT,
and at one point said it would be consistent. Id. 6.25.
124. Submission of the United States, supra note 3, 50.
125. Gasoline Decision, supra note 8, 6.26.
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this technical point, the Panel may have been influenced by the
fact that the United States had nearly adopted a regulation im-
plementing this type of program for Venezuela, 126 and that the
United States has the burden of proof for Article XX justifica-
tions. 127 Though the United States could be correct, the Panel
found that they had not adequately proved that this alternative
was technically infeasible.12 Thus, if this alternative was avail-
able, and if it was either GATT-consistent or less inconsistent,
the United States could not claim its discriminatory method was
"necessary."
B. THE BROADER ISSUES UNDER THE INDrviDuAL BASELINE
ALTERNATIVE
The issue lurking just below the surface of the case was
whether the U.S. gasoline regulation would have been GATT-
consistent if it had allowed importers to use the same rule as
domestic refiners: individual baselines for those who have the
data and statutory baselines for those who do not. The Panel
did say, almost in passing, that it thought such a proof standard
would be consistent with GATT Articles III and 1.129
126. See supra notes 43-51 (describing the debate over the compromise pro-
posal). Although the proposal failed in Congress, EPA officials supported it.
See supra note 43. The United States, however, maintains that it could not
have worked for technical reasons. Submission of the United States, supra note
3, 101.
127. See, e.g., GATT Dispute Resolution Panel, United States-Measures Af-
fecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, GATT Doc. DS23/R, BISD 39th Supp.
206, 5.41 (1993) (panel report adopted June 19, 1992).
128. Gasoline Decision, supra note 8, 6.26.
129. Id. $ 6.25. In that paragraph the Panel report states:
The Panel noted finally that a regulatory scheme using foreign refiner
baselines, to the extent that it did not distinguish between imported
gasoline on the basis of its country of origin, would not necessarily con-
travene Article I or other provisions of the General Agrement, and that
the United States, notwithstanding suggestions that certain importers
might have equitable concerns, had not established the contrary.
Id. (emphasis added). This paragraph, however, conflicts with an earlier state-
ment in the Panel report, which reads:
The Panel observed that the distinction in the Gasoline Rule between
refiners on the one hand, and importers and blenders on the other,
which affected the treatment of imported gasoline with respect to do-
mestic gasoline, was related to certain differences in the characteris-
tics of refiners, blenders and importers, and the nature of the data held
by them. However, Article III:4 of the General Agreement deals with
the treatment to be accorded to like products; its wording does not al-
low less favourable treatment dependent on the characteristics of the
producer and the nature of the data held by it.
Id. 6.11. (emphasis added).
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This alternative of individual baselines for everyone raises
two sets of problems. First, several earlier panel reports have
ruled that GATT Article III does not permit governments to dis-
criminate between like products based on factors that relate to
the character of the manufacturer rather than the character of
the product. 130 An individual baseline method would accept or
reject gasoline based on past performance of each individual re-
finer. The gasoline Panel's statement that this regulation would
not violate Article I and Article III appears to conflict with those
holdings. Certainly, if GATT wishes to reconsider those hold-
ings, or to distinguish this case from them, a more extended
analysis is required. As GATT precedents now stand, individual
baselines would violate Article III.
The second question that would arise concerns whether the
United States could justify the individual baseline method by
saying that it is necessary under Article XX to achieve the envi-
ronmental purpose in question. A decision of necessity would be
based on alternatives.'13 The United States clearly has a
GATT-consistent alternative in the 1990 statutory baseline
method. That method would also be the least trade distortive.
The United States would argue, however, that the 1990 statu-
tory baseline was not a reasonable alternative, because the fea-
tures of the individual baseline method were necessary to
accomplish the environmental objective. Only if the Panel ac-
cepted that argument could an individual baseline program
withstand a GATT challenge, as the least GATT-inconsistent
method.
C. THE ARTICLE XX REASONABLENESS STANDARD AND
PouicAn NECESSITY
The United States clearly had options other than the dis-
criminatory gasoline regulation, at least one of which would be
technically feasible. The entire gasoline dispute, then, turns on
the question of reasonableness. GATT panels interpreting Arti-
cle XX have often stated the "reasonable alternative" standard,
130. See GATT Dispute Resolution Panel, United States-Restrictions on
Imports of Tuna From Mexico, GATT Doc. DS21IR, BISD 39th Supp. 155 (1993).
GATT Dispute Resolution Panel, United States-Measures Affecting Alcoholic
and Malt Beverages, GATT Doc. DS23/R, BISD 39th Supp. 206, (1993) (panel
report adopted June 19, 1992); supra note 59 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the Tuna decision).
131. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text (describing the Article
XX standard).
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but none have clearly defined it.132 The gasoline dispute Panel
could have clarified "reasonable," but failed to do so.
Though a statutory baseline standard would be the most
trade neutral approach, the United States had valid reasons for
rejecting it. Possible U.S. justifications for the discrimination
include (1) fairness to refiners and (2) political acceptance. 133
Currently WTO panels only consider technical problems as justi-
fications for discrimination. Perhaps, however, problems of eq-
uity and political acceptability should be considered as well.
As a matter of equity, the EPA chose the individual baseline
method, over the strictly statutory method to reduce the burden
on domestic refiners with dirtier than average gasoline.134
Since both the individual baseline and statutory baseline meth-
ods would achieve the same result in terms of gasoline cleanli-
ness, they should implement the less burdensome method. 135 A
statutory baseline would affect every refiner on the dirty side of
the average adversely, because they would need to adjust pro-
duction processes to meet the guidelines, or sell their gasoline at
a lower price, so that it can be blended with offsetting clean gas-
oline. 136 Refiners with gasoline that already meets or exceeds
the statutory baseline, however, would not be affected by the
regulation. Certain refiners, therefore, would bear the entire
burden of the regulation. With individual baselines, however,
no refiner is adversely affected, unless, of course, their gasoline
quality is worse than 1990 levels. The individual baseline
method, therefore, appears to be the least disruptive means of
achieving the goals of the CAA. Further, the effects of some gas-
oline components on the environment remained unclear at the
time of the gasoline regulation.1 37 Given the uncertainty of the
environmental impact, the EPA did not want to require major
production modifications of any refiner.
Political feasibility is another possible motivation of the
EPA for choosing the mixed individual and statutory baseline
132. Id.
133. See generally Nichols, supra note 9, at 15-16.
134. See Submission of the United States, supra note 3, J 84, 87. One goal
of the individual baseline method was to avoid requiring refiners from making
gasoline modifications. Id. 84.
135. See generally Submission of the United States, supra note 3, 86.
136. See Submission of Venezuela, supra note 17, at 9-10. The same situa-
tion that would result for domestic refiners under a statutory baseline resulted
for importers under the gasoline regulation. See supra notes 85-86 (outlining
Venezuela's options under the gasoline regulation).
137. See, e.g., supra notes 18-19 (explaining that the reason some ingredi-
ents were not included in the simple model was a lack of data).
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system. In other words, a desire to ensure political acceptability
of the gasoline regulation could provide another reason, beyond
notions of fairness, for the attempt to limit the burden on domes-
tic refiners. The EPA needed support from both domestic gaso-
line refiners and environmentalists. The individual baseline
system does not burden any domestic refiner, and at the same
time furthers the environmental purpose of the CAA.
Two problems arise from this reasoning. First, the conclu-
sion that either a statutory baseline program or the mixed pro-
gram would lead to the same result is not correct. Under the
mixed system, the average quality of gasoline in any given year
would equal the quality in 1990 only if each refiner sold the
same amount as they sold in 1990. For example, if refiners of
dirtier gasoline sell more now than in 1990, and refiners of
cleaner gasoline sell the same amount or less, the overall aver-
age quality will decrease. 138 Also, the results of the two alterna-
tive programs likely will differ, because it is unreasonable to
assume that refiners producing cleaner-than-required gasoline
will lower their quality if the statutory baseline applies to them.
The statutory baseline would serve as a minimum quality level,
not a mandatory level. Thus, while gasoline purity would re-
main constant under an individual baseline system, it may actu-
ally increase under a statutory baseline program.
The second problem with the individual baseline notion is
that most foreign refiners cannot meet the requirements.
Though the Panel did not find the data persuasive, U.S. studies
have shown that calculating baselines through modeling would
be infeasible for many foreign refiners. 139 The EPA, therefore,
set a statutory baseline for foreign refiners without an individ-
ual determination of whether they could meet the requirements
to model individual baselines. The United States could have al-
lowed those who were able to meet the requirements to use indi-
vidual baselines.
Rather than intending to exclude foreign refiners from the
gasoline regulation, the EPA first chose the most logical way to
carry out the CAA in the United States, and then realized that it
was infeasible for importers. 140 It seems as though protection-
138. See Submission of Venezuela, supra note 17, at 17.
139. See supra notes 33-36 (detailing the EPA's conclusion that individual
baselines were not feasible).
140. Nichols, supra note 9, at 47. Assistant Administrator Nichols testified
that the first EPA proposal allowed all refiners and importers to set individual
baselines. Later, however, they realized the infeasibility of that method for im-
porters, and differentiated based on foreign or domestic refiners. Id.
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ism did not motivate the EPA, but rather was an effect of the
program. If structuring the burden to avoid opposition moti-
vated the gasoline regulation, then the harm to foreign refiners
was only incidental.
Notions of fairness, political feasibility, or a combination of
both, influenced the EPA to select the mixed method over a non-
discriminatory method. The issue, then, is whether these no-
tions could fit within the Article XX definition of "necessary," so
that the WTO reasonably would not expect the United States to
take another approach.
WTO panels could extend Article XX to include political fea-
sibility as a justification for choosing one measure over another.
In addition, perhaps Article XX justifications for GATT viola-
tions should be more flexible when an environmental measure is
involved. Under current standards, environmental objectives
often result in burdensome trade effects and are subjected to
GATT scrutiny. 141 A broader reading of Article XX by WTO
panels might effectuate a more reasonable result for environ-
mental disputes. This Note does not propose that political feasi-
bility should always be considered as a justification under
Article XX. For example, this approach should not be applied in
cases of intentional discrimination. Under the circumstances
here, however, the gasoline regulation may not have been en-
acted at all without political compromise. Although this ap-
proach is subject to abuse, regulatory schemes depend on
political acceptability.
Regardless of how the Panel had decided, it could have
taken the opportunity to clarify an interpretation of "necessary."
GATT panels, while following the "reasonable alternatives"
standard, have not clearly interpreted the meaning of those
words, and have not considered them in light of an environmen-
tal product characterization dispute.142 Such environmental is-
sues surely will continue to arise, and defending countries will
continue to look for a liberal reading of Article XX, so that envi-
ronmentally motivated regulations may be upheld. The Panel,
however, failed to define "necessary" beyond restating the gen-
eral notion of reasonable alternatives.
141. Charnovitz, supra note 48, at 467.
142. See generally supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text (describing
panel decisions under Article XX).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Panel's narrow decision was proper under current
GATT law. The gasoline regulation clearly violates Article 111:4,
and is not "necessary" under prior Article XX decisions. Political
necessity, however, plays a role in the structure and enforce-
ment of environmental laws. Distributing the burden of product
standards depends on more than technical feasibility; it involves
fairness and acceptability.
The gasoline dispute raises the question of whether GATT
Article XX should be expanded to allow environmentally moti-
vated, but adversely discriminatory, regulations which can be
justified by political necessity. The GATT should take a stand
on this issue to provide clarity in future situations. Some may
argue that allowing political feasibility to provide a defense for
trade discrimination will open a Pandora's Box. It will start a
flood of disputes arguing exactly how broadly Article XX can be
read, and what constitutes political necessity. Adapting to new
ideas, however, always involves a degree of risk taking and re-
quires some line drawing. If the WTO chooses to continue inter-
preting Article XX narrowly and only allow GATT violations for
reasons of technical necessity, it should say so clearly. If it is
willing to limit the definition of "reasonable alternatives,"
thereby expanding the scope of Article XX, then the gasoline dis-
pute may have provided it with an opportunity which it failed to
take.
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